With vast databases at their disposal, private tech companies can compete with public statistical agencies to provide population statistics. However, private companies face different incentives to provide high-quality statistics and to protect the privacy of the people whose data are used. When both privacy protection and statistical accuracy are public goods, private providers tend to produce at least one suboptimally, but it is not clear which. We model a firm that publishes statistics under a guarantee of differential privacy. We prove that provision by the private firm results in inefficiently low data quality in this framework.
Traditionally, statistical agencies have been charged with publishing summaries of data collected from the nation's citizens and businesses. Their data collection activities are expensive, and at risk of losing funding, despite an increasing demand for reliable data.
1 In this environment, one option is to augment, or replace, public statistical programs with information collected by private companies. Indeed, companies that aggregate personal data-e.g. When the benefits of more accurate population statistics and privacy losses are shared by all citizens, we show that private provision will result in inefficiently low levels of data accuracy and inefficiently high levels of privacy protection.
To establish suboptimality of the private provision of population statistics, we 1 For evidence of increasing demand for Census data, see the discussion in Ruggles et al. (2019) .
model the problem faced by a private data custodian who wants to sell population statistics. Our model extends Ghosh and Roth (2015, GR hereafter) , who consider the problem of a data custodian, or producer, with legal possession of confidential data that was originally provided by data owners. The custodian wants to sell population statistics based on the confidential data to data users, who need the statistical summaries sold by the custodian to improve decision-making. We formalize the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy by assuming the custodian publishes using a differentially private mechanism. Operating this mechanism to publish statistics with a given level of accuracy requires the data owners to incur a known and quantifiable loss of privacy. Ghosh and Roth (2015) establish a minimum-cost method for purchasing privacy-loss rights from the data owners.
Unlike Ghosh and Roth, who treat the demand for accuracy as exogenous, we assume an endogenous demand for data accuracy, and focus on its implications for the efficiency of private provision. The producer therefore balances the demand for statistical accuracy against a demand for privacy protection. We model consumers who have heterogeneous preferences for the accuracy of the published statistical summaries, as well as for privacy protection. This formulation nests the more intuitive case in which the users of data are distinct from the population on whom data are collected.
Our model of data publication is based on differential privacy (Dwork 2006; Dwork et al. 2006; 2017) , which has been adopted by tech companies like Google and Apple, as well as by the U.S. Census Bureau. 2 Differential privacy is an approach to publishing statistical summaries from confidential data sources that allows the publisher to make explicit, mathematically rigorous, statements about how much privacy-measured as a quantity-is lost with each publication. Furthermore, differentially private publications can induce an explicit positive relationship between accuracy of the published data and the amount of privacy loss.
3 Crucially, we model both privacy protection and accuracy as public goods.
Thus, it is not a priori obvious whether the private provider will provide too much or too little privacy protection. Data accuracy is a public good, since any consumer may access and use the published data without reducing its accuracy for some other consumer (it is non-rival) and no consumer can block another consumer's use (it is non-excludable). In plain English, all persons can learn and benefit from the use of high-quality data by others, and they can also access those data directly themselves. They value what they learn. And they understand that what they learn is more useful if it is more accurate. Privacy protection is also a public good because all individuals in the database benefit from the same level of privacy protection embodied in the producer's data publication process, an implication of the Ghosh-Roth mechanism (non-rivalry in consumption for privacy protection).
We find that private provision results in suboptimally low data accuracy. As in Samuelson's classic model (Samuelson 1954) , the external benefit of data accuracy to all consumers is not captured by the willingness-to-pay of the consumer with the greatest private value. By contrast, the demand for privacy protection is derived from the data provider's cost-minimization problem. The provider buys just enough data-use rights (privacy loss) to sell the data accuracy to the consumer with the highest valuation. All other consumers use the published data for free.
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While the suboptimality of private provision of public goods is well-understood (Spence 1975) , modeling the origin and nature of suboptimality in the market for population statistics is not. Given the adoption of differential privacy by the U.S. Census Bureau, and the increasing demand for public data products from tech companies, it is important to consider how markets might, and might not, appropriately balance society's interests in privacy protection and data quality (Abowd and Schmutte 2019). Our paper is also broadly related to recent work in the economics of privacy (Acquisti et al. 2016; Heffetz and Ligett 2014; Goldfarb et al. 2015) , which focuses on the role of privacy in facilitating the efficient use of customer data. Few papers have considered the economic tradeoff between privacy protection and data quality in the production of population statistics. Ghosh and Roth (2015) , on which we build, and related papers in electronic commerce (Li et al. 2014 ) assume the demand for accuracy is exogenous. In some settings, this is appropriate-for example, when a company is mining its customer data for internal use. Publishing data summaries is, as we now show, another matter altogether.
Preliminary Concepts
This section provides our formal definitions of privacy and data accuracy. Our definitions are based on a computer science literature studying formal privacy, and so may be unfamiliar to economists. Our summary draws on several sources to which we refer the reader who is interested in more details ( We introduce the notion of differential privacy, which is key to understand-ing our analysis. Differentially private data publications do not allow an outsider to learn "too much" about any individual data record based on statistical summaries of the full database. For our purposes, this framework is useful because differential privacy tells us, for any level of data accuracy, how much privacy loss an efficient provider must be willing to tolerate. consider in this paper focuses on publication of a single-valued query, but note that in general the query answer Q(D) may be vector-valued.
Databases and Queries

Query Release Mechanisms, Privacy, and Accuracy
The data curator operates a query release mechanism that provides answers to queries Q given a database D. 
Differential Privacy
Our definitions of differential privacy and accuracy for the query release mechanism follow Dwork et al. (2006) and Kifer and Machanavajjhala (2011). 6 Definition 2 (ε-differential privacy) Query release mechanism M satisfies ε-differential privacy if for ε > 0, for all pairs of neighboring databases D, D ′ , all queries Q ∈ Q,
where B are the measurable subsets of R, and the randomness in M is due exclusively to the mechanism and not the process generating the database D.
Accuracy
We next define our measure of accuracy. For any query, Q ∈ Q, the query release mechanism returns an answer, a, that depends on the input database, the content of the query response, and the randomization induced by the query release mechanism.
Definition 3 ((α, β)-accuracy) Query release mechanism M satisfies (α, β)-accuracy if for Q ∈ Q and a output from M(D, Q),
This definition guarantees that the error in the answer provided by the mechanism is bounded above by α with probability (1−β). 7 The probabilities in the definition of (α, β)-accuracy are induced by the query release mechanism.
Example
To illustrate the problem stylized by the model, consider the following scenario.
Under 
Private Provision of Population Statistics
In this section, we model a data provider selling public statistics produced according to a differentially private mechanism by purchasing rights to use records in an underlying confidential database. Since accuracy and privacy protection are both public goods, the consequences of private provision are theoretically ambiguous until further structure is placed on the model. Given the structure below, we prove that too little data accuracy and too much privacy will be supplied by a private provider compared to the social welfare maximizing solution.
Model Setup
Each of N private individuals possesses a single bit of information, b i , that is already stored in a database maintained by a trusted curator. 8 In addition to their private information, each individual is endowed with income, y i .
Individuals each consume one unit of the published statistic, which has accuracy I defined in terms of (α, β)-accuracy, that is I = (1 − α). Since I is a public good, all consumers enjoy the benefits of I, but each consumer is charged the market price p I , to be determined within the model, for her "share" of I, which we denote I i , and the balance of the public good, which we denote I˜i is paid for by the other consumers. Thus, I = I i + I˜i for all consumers.
The preferences of consumer i are given by the indirect utility function
Equation (1) implies that preferences are quasilinear in data accuracy, I, privacy loss, ε i , and log income, ln y i . 9 We incorporate income and accuracy in the utility 8 Trusted curator can have a variety of meanings. We mean that the database is held by an entity, governmental or private, whose legal authority to hold the data is not challenged and whose physical data security is adequate to prevent privacy breaches due to theft of the confidential data themselves. We do not model how the trusted curator got possession of the data, but we do restrict all publications based on these data to use statistics produced by a query release mechanism that meets the same privacy and confidentiality constraints. 9 In this section, we keep the description of preferences for data accuracy and privacy protection function because they are required for the arguments in this section.
The term p ε is the common price per unit of privacy, also to be determined by the model. The receipt p ε ε i represents the total payment an individual receives if her bit is used in an ε-differentially private mechanism. The individual's marginal preferences for data accuracy (a "good") and privacy loss (a "bad," really an input here), (η i , γ i ) > 0, are not known to the data provider, but their population distributions are public information. Therefore, the mechanism for procuring privacy has to be individually rational and dominant-strategy truthful.
We do not include any explicit interaction between the publication of statistical data and the market for private goods. This assumption is not without consequence, and we make it to facilitate exposition of our key point: that data accuracy may be under-provided due to its public-good properties. Violations of privacy might affect the goods market through targeted advertising and price discrimination. The accuracy of public statistics may also spill over to the goods market by making firms more efficient. These are topics for future work.
The Cost of Producing Data Accuracy
A supplier of statistical information wants to produce an (α, β)-accurate estimate, s, of the population statistic
i.e., a normalized query estimating the proportion of individuals with the property encoded in b i . This property could be something highly sensitive, such as the individual's citizenship status, sexual orientation, or whether she suffers from a as close as possible to the GR specification. They allow for the possibility that algorithms exist that can provide differential privacy protection that varies with i; hence ε i appears in equation (1). They subsequently prove that ε i = ε for all i in their Theorem 3.3.
particular health condition.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 in Ghosh and Roth (2015) prove that publishing the statis-
provides (α, β)-accuracy, and requires a privacy loss of
members of the population. Lap Purchasing the data-use rights from the H least privacy-loving members of the population; i.e., those with the smallest γ i , is the minimum-cost, envy-free implementation mechanism (Ghosh and Roth 2015).
10 GR provide two mechanisms for implementing their VCG auction. We rely on their mechanism MinCostAuction and the properties given in their Proposition 4.5. See Appendix A.2 for additional details.
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We now derive the producer's problem of providing the statistic for a given level of data accuracy, I. If p ε is the payment per unit of privacy loss, the total cost of production is c(I) = p ε Hε, where the right-hand side terms can be defined in terms of I as follows. Using the arguments above, the producer must purchase from H(I) consumers the right to use their data to computeŝ. Then,
Under the VCG mechanism, the price of privacy loss must be p ε = Q 
where the production technology derived by GR implies
Example
The results of Ghosh and Roth (2015) hold even with an arbitrary correlation between privacy preferences and measured characteristics. Obtaining accuracy in the presence of potentially extreme selection bias makes it necessary to count almost everyone. In practice, the costs of publication are determined by the level of privacy-loss required, and the preferences of someone with extreme aversion to privacy loss.
Recall Example 1 from Section 1.3, which involved computing the share of the 
Suboptimality of Private Provision
Suppose a private profit-maximizing, price-taking, firm sellsŝ with accuracy (α, β), that is, with data accuracy I at price p I . Then, profits P (I) are
If it sells at all, it will produce I to satisfy the first-order condition
where the solution is evaluated at I V CG . 12 The price of data accuracy is equal to the marginal cost of increasing the amount of privacy protection-data-use rightsthat must be purchased. There are two terms. The first term is the increment to marginal cost from increasing the amount each privacy-right seller must be paid because ε has been marginally increased, thus reducing privacy protection for all.
12 The second order condition is
The only term in the second derivative of C V CG (I) that is not unambiguously positive is
. We assume that this term is dominated by the other, always positive, terms in the second derivative. Sufficient conditions are that Q () is the quantile function from the log-normal distribution or the quantile function from a finite mixture of normals, and that The second term is the increment to marginal cost from increasing the number of people from whom data-use rights with privacy protection ε must be purchased.
As long as the cost function is strictly increasing and convex, the existence and uniqueness of a solution is guaranteed.
Competitive Market Equilibrium
At market price p I , consumer i's willingness to pay for data accuracy will be given by solving
where I˜i is the amount of data accuracy provided from the payments by all other consumers, as noted above. Consumer i's willingness to pay is non-negative if, and only if, η i ≥ p I ; that is, if the marginal utility from increasing I exceeds the price. If there exists at least one consumer for whom η i ≥ p I , then the solution to equation (7) is attained for I V CG > 0.
We next show that there is only one such consumer. It is straightforward to verify that the consumers are playing a classic free-rider game (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, pp. 361-363) . In the competitive equilibrium, the only person willing to pay for the public good is one with the maximum value of η i . All others will purchase zero data accuracy but still consume the data accuracy purchased by this lone consumer. Specifically, the equilibrium price and data accuracy will satisfy
whereη is the maximum value of η i in the population-the taste for accuracy of the person who desires it the most. However, the Pareto optimal consumption of data accuracy, I 0 , solves
Marginal cost is positive, dC V CG (I 0 ) dI > 0, and N i=1 η i >η; therefore, data accuracy will be under-provided by a competitive supplier when data accuracy is a public good as long as marginal cost is increasing, which we prove below.
More succinctly, I
V CG < I 0 . Therefore, privacy protection must be over-provided, ε V CG < ε 0 , by equation (6). 
The Price-discriminating Monopsonist Provider of Data accuracy
Now consider the problem of a single private data provider who producesŝ with accuracy (α, β) using the same technology as in equations (5) and (6). We now allow the producer to price-discriminate in the acquisition of data-use rights-that is, the private data-accuracy supplier is a price discriminating monopsonist. This relaxes the assumptions of the VCG mechanism in GR to allow for the unrealistic possibility that the data accuracy provider knows the population values of γ i .
They acknowledge this theoretical possibility when discussing the individual rationality and dominant-strategy truthful requirements of their mechanism. They reject it as unrealistic, and we agree. We are considering this possibility to show that even when the private data-accuracy provider is allowed to acquire data-use rights with a lower cost strategy than the VCG mechanism, data accuracy will still 13 The reader is reminded that a smaller ε implies more privacy protection. It is also worth commenting that in the GR formulation the single consumer with positive willingness to pay is the entity running the VCG auction. That person is buying data-use rights from the other consumers, computing the statistic for publication, then releasing the statistic so that all other consumers may use it. That is why we have modeled this as a public good. Our formulation is fully consistent with GR's scientist seeking data for a grant-supported publication.
be under-provided.
The producer must decide how many data-use rights (and associated privacy loss ε, the same value for all i) to purchase from each member of the database, or, equivalently, how much to charge members of the database to opt out of participation in the mechanism for computing the statistic. (They cannot opt out of the database.) Let π ∈ {0, 1} N be the participation vector. Using the Lindahl approach, let p
be the price that satisfies, for each consumer i,
Equation (10) says that the Lindahl prices are those such that the choice of ε is exactly the value that each individual would optimally choose on her own. Even with our assumption of linear preferences, the Lindahl prices are unique for every consumer who participates in the mechanism for computing the statistic.
Given a target data accuracy of I = (1 − α), the producer's cost minimization problem is the linear program
The solution is for the producer to set π i = 1 for the H members of the database with the smallest p
for all I, which will be proven in Theorem 1, then the Lindahl purchaser of datause rights will produce more data accuracy at any given price of data accuracy than the VCG purchaser.
By construction, the Lindahl solution satisfies the Pareto optimality criterion for data-use rights acquisition that
Once again, the supplier implements the query response mechanism of equation (3) with
-differential privacy and (1 − I, β)-accuracy but pays each consumer differently for her data-use right. Notice that equation (12) describes the Pareto optimal privacy loss whether or not one acknowledges that the privacy protection afforded by ε is non-rival, only partially excludable, and, therefore, also a public good.
To implement the Lindahl solution, the data producer must be able to exclude the bits, b i , of specific individuals when computing the statistic, and must have perfect knowledge of the every marginal disutility γ i of increasing ε. When this information is not available, the producer can, and will, implement the first-best allocation by choosing a price through the VCG auction mechanism used by GR.
For readers familiar with the data privacy literature, we note that the statement that technology is given by equations (5) and (6) 
Proof of Suboptimality
Theorem 1 If preferences are given by equation (1), the query response mechanism satisfies equation (6) for ε-differential privacy with (1 − I, β)-accuracy, cost functions satisfy (5) for the VCG mechanism, and (11) for the Lindahl mechanism, the population distribution of γ is given by F γ (bounded, absolutely continuous, everywhere differentiable, and with quantile function Q satisfying the conditions noted in Section 3), the population distribution of η has bounded support on [0,η] , and the population in the database is represented as a continuum with measure function H (absolutely continuous, everywhere differentiable, and with total measure N) then I V CG < I L and I V CG < I 0 , where I 0 is the Pareto optimal level of I solving equation (9), I L is the privately-provided level when using the Lindahl mechanism to procure data-use rights and I V CG is the privately-provided level when using the VCG procurement mechanism.
Proof. By construction, F γ (γ) is the distribution of Lindahl prices. Given a target error bound α, corresponding to data accuracy level I = (1 − α), the private producer must procure data-use rights from the respondents in the confidential data with ε(I) units of privacy protection from a measure of H(I) individuals.
ε is the disutility of privacy loss for the marginal participant in the VCG and Lindahl mechanisms, respectively. The total cost of producing I = (1 − α) using the VCG mechanism is equation (5):
while the total cost of implementing the Lindahl mechanism is equation (11):
Using integration by parts and the properties of the quantile function,
Differentiating with respect to I,
The corresponding expression for
Comparison of the preceding marginal cost expressions establishes that 0 <
The results stated in the theorem follow by using the equilibrium price for the private market sale of I, which is p I in equation (1),
and the conditions on Q imply that
Conclusion
The concept of differential privacy allows a natural interpretation of privacy protection as a commodity over which individuals might have preferences. In many important contexts, privacy protection and data accuracy are not purely private commodities. When both are public goods, the market allocations might not be optimal. The solution to the social planning problem that optimally provides both public goods-data accuracy and privacy protection-delivers more data accuracy, but less privacy protection, than the VCG mechanism for private-provision of data. The reason is that the VCG mechanism for procuring data-use rights ignores the public-good nature of the statistics that are published after a citizen sells the right to use her private data in those publications.
This matters because the demand for public data is greater than ever, while funding for statistical agencies has been relatively stagnant. It is increasingly likely that data users will turn to private companies to obtain the information they demand. Our results suggest that, while the policy debate has centered on regulating the privacy loss from this trend, it is also important to counterbalance the demand for privacy against the social value of reliable population statistics.
Abowd and Schmutte (2019) propose a model for determining the optimal balance between privacy and accuracy in this social choice framework. More research, both theoretical and empirical, will help data users and policy makers navigate our modern data-rich environment.
The VCG mechanism also underprovides accuracy compared with the fictitious Lindahl mechnanism. We did not identify any relation between optimal provision and the Lindahl mechanism, suggesting our results are sensitive to the setup. Our model inherits some limitations (e.g., simple market structure) of the original GR framework. We also inherit the positive aspects of their model. In par-ticular, the results of GR's Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 are not tied to a specific auction mechanism.
In concluding, we point out possible extensions of our model. We have assumed a private data custodian must purchase privacy rights in order to use data in a published statistic. We make this assumption because it reflects the growing demand that companies be held accountable for the privacy of their customers' data through increasingly explicit means. However, if we assume companies may freely use their customers' data, then our conclusions will likely be reversed, with 
where D (T ) differs from D only on the indices in T .
In the population, the statistic of interest is an unnormalized query
The ε i -minimally differentially private algorithm A (D) delivers an outputŝ that is a noisy estimate of s, where the noise is induced by randomness in the query release mechanism embedded in A. Each individual in the population when offered a payment p i > 0 in exchange for the privacy loss ε i > 0 computes an individual privacy cost equal to υ i ε i , where
using an algorithm A (D) that is ε i (υ)-minimally differentially private to deliver a query responseŝ ∈ R and a vector of payments p (υ) ∈ R n + . GR-Definition 2.4 defines individually rational mechanisms. GR-Definition 2.5 defines dominantstrategy truthful mechanisms. An individually rational, dominant-strategy truthful mechanism M provides individual i with utility p i (υ) − υ i ε i (υ) ≥ 0 and
where υ˜i is the vector υ with element υ i removed.
GR define k-accuracy in GR-Definition 2.6 using the deviation |ŝ − s| from the outputŝ produced by algorithm A (D) using mechanism M as
where we have reversed the direction of the inequalities and taken the complementary probability to show that this is the unnormalized version of our Definition 3 for a query sequence of length 1. GR also define the normalized query accuracy level as α, which is identical to our usage in Definition 3.
GR-Theorem 3.1 uses the GR definitions of ε i -minimal differential privacy, kaccuracy, and GR-Fact 1 composition to establish that any differentially private mechanism M that is • Sort the individuals in increasing order of their privacy cost, υ 1 ≤ υ 2 ≤ . . . ≤ υ n .
• Find the cut-off value υ k that either exhausts a budget constraint (FairQuery) or meets an accuracy constraint (MinCostAuction).
App. 5
• Assign the set H = {1, . . . , k} .
• Calculate the statisticŝ using a differentially private algorithm that adds
Laplace noise with just enough dispersion to achieve the required differential privacy for the privacy loss purchased from the members of H.
• Pay all members of H the same amount, a function of υ k+1 ; pay all others nothing.
To complete the summary of GR, we note that GR-Theorem 4.1 establishes that
FairQuery is dominant-strategy truthful and individually rational. GR-Proposition 4.4 establishes that FairQuery maximizes accuracy for a given total privacy purchase budget in the class of all dominant-strategy truthful, individually rational, envy-free, fixed-purchase mechanisms. GR-Proposition 4.5 proves that their algorithm MinCostAuction is a VCG mechanism that is dominant-strategy truthful, individually rational and O (αn)-accurate. GR-Theorem 4.6 provides a lower bound on the total cost of purchasing k units of privacy of kυ k+1 GR-Theorem 5.1 establishes that for υ ∈ R n + , no individually rational mechanism can protect the privacy of valuations υ with (k, β)-accuracy for k < n 2 . In our application of GR, we use N as the total population. Our γ i is identical to the GR υ i . We define the query as a normalized query, which means that query accuracy is defined in terms of α instead of k; hence, our implementation of the VCG mechanism achieves (α, β) where the inclusion of β generalizes GR's implicit restriction to β = 1 3 in their accuracy definition. We define the individual amount of privacy loss in the same manner as GR.
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